I. Things are equivocally1 named, when they have the name only in common,
the definition (or statement of essence) corresponding with the name being
different. For instance, while a man and a portrait can properly both be called
‘animals,’ these are equivocally named2. For they have the name only in common,
the definitions (or statements of essence) corresponding with the name being
different. For if you are asked to define what the being an animal means in the case
of the man and the portrait, you give in either case a definition appropriate to that case alone.
Things are univocally named, when not only they bear the same name but the
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تعداد صفحات نسخه دیجیتال : 218
Preface
The Organon, The Categories (I-XV)
The Metaphysics, Book I and II
On Being and Essence, Prologue, Chapters One and Two
The Summa Theologica, Vol. I, First Part, Treatise on God
First Truths
Discourse on Metaphysics
Critique of Pure Reason, Introduction
The Phenomenology of Mind
The Limitation of Being
An Introduction to Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
The Preface of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (A Summary)